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 An Extension of the Core Solution Concept




A solution concept for cooperative games, the extended core, is introduced.
This concept is always nonempty yet coincides with the core whenever it
is nonempty. Moreover, a non-cooperative framework can generate the ex-
tended core. Every transferable utility game is associated with a two-player
zero-sum non-cooperative game. The min-max values of the associated zero-
sum games characterize when cooperative games have nonempty cores. If the
core is empty, the min-max value determines how an exogenous regulator can
impose costs on proper coalition formation so that there are no incentives
to deviate from extended core imputations, which are necessarily feasible in
the original game. In order to choose among the imputations belonging to
the extended core, a proportional version of the nucleolus is proposed as a
selection device.
1 Introduction
1.1 The Empty Core Problem
The core is by far the cooperative solution concept that is most frequently
applied in economics. Numerous economic elds such as public economics,
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1political economy and industrial organization to name a few, have successfully
applied this solution concept. Nevertheless, there exist important economic
situations which translate into environments where the core is empty. In
such settings the core is not applicable.
The question of how to handle empty-core situations is of great importance
because the number of games in which the core cannot be applied is consider-
able.1 Still, the issue is frequently avoided by imposing enough assumptions
so that the core of a game is nonempty. Despite including some of the best
pieces of research in economic theory,2 the cooperative game literature does
not address the empty-core problem.
In the literature it is possible to nd attempts of dening solution concepts
that can be applied to empty-core situations. Within this class of concepts
the main examples are the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler 1964) [2]
and the kernel (Davis and Maschler 1965) [4]. Although technically sound,
the applicability of these alternative solution concepts is debatable. In very
few situations, at least when compared against the core, they have been used
as a tool to study economic elds outside game theory.
Two main reasons can account for this lack of applicability: First, these
solution concepts are not suitable to build upon core applications (which
constitute the vast majority of the literature where cooperative games have
been utilized) because in games where the core is nonempty, they do not
coincide with the core. In cases where the core is nonempty, inclusion of the
core (with the bargaining set) or nonempty intersection with the core (with
the kernel) are the best results available. Second, these alternative concepts
lack the simplicity and intuitive appeal of the core. As a consequence, it is
quite burdensome to actually compute these solution concepts, even for very
simple examples.3
1Bondareva (1963) [3] and Shapley (1967) [14] characterized these types of games.
2E.g. The Debreu-Scarf core convergence theorem, the Shapley and Shubik work on
market games [16], and the asymptotic results on -cores, e.g. [20].
3According to [10] to calculate the bargaining set of a cooperative game with four
players, it is necessary to solve 150 systems of linear inequalities.
21.2 An Alternative
In this project we provide an alternative to deal with empty-core environ-
ments: the extended core. The main characteristic of the extended core is
that, unlike the core, it is never empty. Nevertheless, in cases where the
core is nonempty both concepts coincide. Therefore, the extended core is a
good candidate to generalize the numerous applications of the core to set-
tings where the core is empty. Even when this generalization is not possible,
we show how the tools that dene the extended core can be used to dene a
notion that measures \how far" a game is from having a nonempty core.
After going through the formal denition of the extended core, we point out
dierent interpretations of the solution concept. The extended core can be
justied in three dierent ways, one of them based on tools taken from non-
cooperative game theory and the other two arguing from the cooperative
standpoint. This versatility intends to emphasize that the extended core is
both simple and intuitive.
1.2.1 Non-cooperative Point of View
The challenge generated by the rst concern (see Section 1:1, last paragraph)
is to describe the core within a framework that is also applicable to games in
which the core is empty. We achieve this goal by using non-cooperative game
theory: We associate to every cooperative game (with a nonempty core) a
non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game in a similar fashion to Aumann
1989 [1]. We identify Nash equilibrium strategies4 for the row player with
core vectors.5 One of the main contributions of this work is to understand
that exactly the same exercise can be performed with an empty core game.
The set of vectors that result from this experiment conform the extended core.
4As we are talking about a zero-sum game, the term min-max strategies is more accu-
rate.
5One of the most appealing features of the associated game is the ability to link the
most important non-cooperative concept, Nash equilibrium, with the most important co-
operative concept: the core.
31.2.2 Cooperative Point of View
Besides the theoretical interest of such a solution concept, there exist two
natural economic interpretations of the extended core. The rst one requires
incrementing the aggregate payo until the game eventually has a nonempty
core. Then, the core vectors of this enlarged game are normalized so that
they add up to the original aggregate payo. The result of this procedure is
precisely the extended core vectors. This exercise can be thought of as the
set of players asking for a loan, choosing a core payo vector, and then paying
the loan according to the proportions established by the chosen payo vector.
Our second interpretation of the extended core is based on nding a way
so that coalitions have fewer incentives to block. This can be interpreted
as incrementing coalition formation costs. With a suciently high level of
costs every game eventually has a nonempty core and moreover, every payo
vector eventually belongs to the core. The extended core consists of those
payo vectors that require the minimum level of costs so that no coalition
wants to block them.
1.3 Choosing a Single Outcome
As the extended core is a multiple valued concept, it is important to estab-
lish a criterion to select among its payo vectors. In a similar way as the
concept of nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969 [13]) can be used to select a particular
payo vector from the core, the proportional nucleolus (Young et. al. 1982
[21]), always chooses a payo vector from the extended core. The nucleolus
formalizes the idea of a fair distribution of output in the sense of choosing
the payo distribution that minimizes the biggest complaint by any coali-
tion. The proportional nucleolus diers from the original nucleolus in the
denition of complaint. This latter version of nucleolus is concerned with
coalitions that suer the biggest proportional loss (as opposed to absolute
loss) of their worth.
42 Notation and Basic Denitions
For completeness, we start by dening some basic concepts in cooperative
game theory.
2.1 Cooperative Games
Denition 2.1: Let N = f1;2;:::;ng. A coalition is dened as any
nonempty subset of N. A cooperative game is an ordered pair (N;v)
where N is the set of agents6 and v : 2N  ! R+ is a function such that
v(;) = 0. Let  (N) be the set of all cooperative games that have N as their
set of agents. For technical reasons throughout this paper it will be assumed
that v(N) > 0.





The core of a cooperative game (N;v) is the set of imputations which no
coalition is able to improve upon. It will be denoted by C(N;v). Rigorously,




xi = v(N) and
X
i2S
xi  v(S) 8S  Ng:
Not every game has a nonempty core. The following necessary and sucient
conditions for a game to have a nonempty core were given independently by
Bondareva [3] and Shapley [14]:
Denition 2.3: A collection of coalitions fS1;S2;:::Skg is called balanced
if there exist non-negative numbers 1;2;:::;k such that
X
Sj3i
j = 1 8i 2 N:
The numbers 1;2;:::;k are called balancing weights.
6We will refer to individuals who take part in a cooperative games as \agents". Indi-
viduals who take part in non-cooperative games will be called \players".
7Notice that in this setting an imputation is not necessarily individually rational.
5Proposition 2.4: (Bondareva [3] / Shapley [14]) The core of a game (N;v)
is nonempty if and only if for every balanced collection fS1;S2;:::Skg with





While the Bondareva-Shapley theorem provides a tractable set of necessary
and sucient conditions for a game to have a nonempty core, it is obviously
true that many games | in fact, a nonempty open set of n-player games
in R2n 1 | fail to satisfy the Bondareva-Shapley conditions and therefore
necessarily have empty cores.
Denition 2.5: Given a game (N;v), its cover (N;  v) (see [16]) is a game
dened by:
 v(S) = max
k X
j=1
jv(Sj) 8S  N
where the maximum is taken over all balanced collections of sub-coalitions
of S, fS1;S2;:::Skg with corresponding weights 1;2;:::;k.
Now we present some examples of games with both nonempty and empty
cores. As we dene new concepts, we will illustrate them in these examples.
2.1.1 Examples of Games with Nonempty Cores
For our rst example, consider a setting with three agents. Agents 1 and
2 own a right glove while agent 3 owns a left glove. The worth of each
coalition is either 0 or 1, depending on whether it can form a right-left pair
of gloves. Formally, this situation can be modeled as a cooperative game
v : 2f1;2;3g  ! f0;1g dened by
6v(;) = 0
v(i) = 0 8 i 2 f1;2;3g
v(1;2) = 0
v(1;3) = v(2;3) = v(1;2;3) = 1
For this game the core is nonempty. Indeed, it is easy to show that C(N;v) =
f(0;0;1)g. We will refer to this game as the gloves game.
2.1.2 Examples of Games with Empty Cores
The second game will be generated by the example given in the motivation
[11].
v(;) = 0
v(i) = 7  1   6 = 1 8 i 2 f1;2;3g
v(i;j) = 7  2   9 = 5 8 i;j 2 f1;2;3g i 6= j
v(1;2;3) = 7  3   14 = 7
For this game the core is empty. Indeed, any imputation that attains e-
ciency will not be stable as there will exist a two player coalition that will
want to deviate. We will refer to this game as the phone game.
For our last example we use the classical game n men and a trunk. Here,
n agents are stuck with a valuable trunk in the middle of the desert. On
his own, no agent can carry the trunk out of the desert. Nevertheless, any
group constituted by two or more of them is able to do so. The characteristic
function generated by these payos is as follows:
v(S) = 0 if jSj  1
v(S) = 1 if jSj > 1
7For this game, the core is empty if n > 2. If n = 2, then the core will coincide
with the set of all imputations.
2.2 The Associated Zero-Sum Non-cooperative Game
In this section we describe a two player non-cooperative zero-sum game
G(N;v) that is generated from any cooperative game (N;v). This zero-
sum game was rst used by Aumann [1] in order to generate an alternative
proof of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem. Instead of dealing directly with
the linear programming problem posed by the core, he translates the model
into an environment where the duality results needed for the proof are em-
bedded in the Min-Max Theorem for zero-sum games. This paper intends
to further exploit the analogy between these two settings in order to give a
non-cooperative support of the extended core.
In such zero-sum game, the row player chooses an agent and the column
player chooses a coalition. The row player gets a strictly positive payo if
and only if the chosen agent belongs to the coalition selected by the column
player. This payo is inversely related to the worth of the coalition chosen
by the second player. In any other case, players receive zero payo.
Denition 2.6: Given any cooperative game (N;v) dene the non-cooperative
zero-sum game G(N;v) by:
 Set of Players: fA;Bg.





v(S) if i 2 S
0 if i = 2 S
and uB =  uA.
Notice that the restriction to coalitions such that v(S) > 0 is imposed just
to avoid dividing by zero. All of the results go through if, for coalitions of
8worth equal to zero, uA(i;S) is replaced by a large enough number M.
Examining the payo matrices of the associated games that correspond to
our examples gives the following results: For the gloves game the payo ma-
trix of G(N;v) is
A n B f 1,3 g f 2,3 g f 1,2,3 g
1 (1,-1) (0,0) (1,-1)
2 (0,0) (1,-1) (1,-1)
3 (1,-1) (1,-1) (1,-1)
Similarly, the payo matrix corresponding to the phone game
A n B f 1 g f 2 g f 3 g f 1,2 g f 1,3 g f 2,3 g f 1,2,3 g















Finally, the payo matrix for three men and a trunk is
A n B f 1,2 g f 1,3 g f 2,3 g f 1,2,3 g
1 (1,-1) (1,-1) (0,0) (1,-1)
2 (1,-1) (0,0) (1,-1) (1,-1)
3 (0,0) (1,-1) (1,-1) (1,-1)
As the game at hand is zero-sum, any Nash equilibrium (mixed) strategy pro-
le always generates the same expected payos. Thus, the associated game
can be assigned a value in the same way that was done by von-Neumann and
Morgenstern [19].
Denition 2.7: Let the pair of strategies (;) be any Nash equilibrium
of the zero-sum game G(N;v). Dene !(N;v) = uA(;). The Min-Max
Theorem guarantees that the value !(N;v) is well dened.
After some arithmetic, !(N;v) can be calculated for each of our examples.
In the gloves game it is evident that a Nash equilibrium occurs when player
A chooses agent 3 and player 2 selects the grand coalition. Thus, !(N;v) = 1.








to her pure strategies and player B gives the same weights
9to the coalitions f1;2g, f1;3g and f2;3g. Then, the expected utility for the




For n men and a trunk, the unique Nash equilibrium occurs when the rst
player gives equal weights 1
n to all agents and the second player gives equal
weights 2
n(n 1) to all coalitions of cardinality two. In such instance, the ex-
pected utility for the rst player is equal to !(N;v) = (n   1)  2
n(n 1) = 2
n.
Notice that the fact that 0 < !(N;v)  1 for every example is not a coinci-
dence. First, as the rst player's expected payo is always strictly positive,
!(N;v) must also be. Second, if things come to worst, player B can always
limit her opponent's payo to 1 by choosing the grand coalition. This rea-
soning proves our rst result.
Proposition 2.8: For any cooperative game (N;v), !(N;v) belongs to the
interval (0;1].
3 Relationship Between (N;v) and G(N;v)
3.1 Nash Equilibria and Core Imputations
We begin by characterizing what kind of associated games are generated by
cooperative games with a nonempty core. The rst result in this direction
is used in Aumann's alternative proof of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [1].
Proposition 3.1: (Aumann) Let (N;v) be any cooperative game. If the
value !(N;v) of the associated game is equal 8 to one, then the core of the
original game is not empty.
An example to illustrate this proposition is the gloves game. For this game,
!(N;v) = 1 and the core is nonempty. The same works for the game of
two men and a trunk. The fact that our examples with an empty core have
a value strictly less than one suggests that the converse of Proposition 3:1
holds. In fact, this is true, as stated formally in the following proposition:
8In the original [1] this result is stated with !(N;v)  1 instead of !(N;v) = 1
10Proposition 3.2: If the core of a cooperative game (N;v) is nonempty, then
the value !(N;v) of the associated game is equal to one.
The method used to prove Propositions 3:1 and 3:2 is constructive. To prove
Proposition 3:1, a core imputation is assigned to any Nash strategy corre-
sponding to player A. Conversely, the proof for Proposition 3:2 shows how
to generate a Nash strategy for player 1 starting from any core imputa-
tion. Thus, we can say even more about the relationship between (N;v)
and G(N;v). When !(N;v) = 1, there is a natural bijection between core
imputations and Nash strategy proles for player A.







x 2 C(N;v) i 9 s.t. (;) is a Nash eqm. of G(N;v)
We proceed to examine this relationship in the particular context of the
nonempty core examples previously described. In the zero-sum game associ-
ated with the gloves game, it is clear that it is optimal for player A to choose
agent 3 in a Nash equilibrium. In the same way, the unique core imputation
of the cooperative game is (0;0;1). In the game two men and a trunk, any
imputation of the form (a;1   a) belongs to the core for a 2 [0;1]. In turn,
it is clear that no matter what mixed strategy player A uses, it will be part
of a Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Cooperative Interpretation of !(N;v)
The fact that a cooperative game (N;v) has an empty core is not an im-
pediment to associate it with it a zero-sum game G(N;v) and a quantity
!(N;v). Various natural questions arise. Are the Nash strategy proles in
G(N;v) related to some relevant set of imputations of the cooperative game?
11If so, does this set preserve, in some sense, the stability properties of the
core? How can !(N;v) be interpreted in the context of the cooperative game
(N;v)? In what follows we attempt to answer each of the previous questions.
Denition 3.3: Given a game (N;v) and a real number k  1, dene the
k-expanded game (N; ^ vk) in the following way:
^ vk(S) = v(S) if S 6= N
^ vk(N) = kv(N)
Dene also
^ k(N;v) = minfk  1 j C(N; ^ vk) 6= ;g:
Intuitively, consider any cooperative game (N;v). If the worth of the grand
coalition is multiplied by a number greater than one, eventually the core will
become nonempty. Then ^ k(N;v) is dened as the smallest number k that
does the trick. Proposition 2:4 and Denition 2:5 imply that ^ v^ k(N) is ex-
actly equal to  v(N), the worth the grand coalition takes in the cover game
(N;  v). This characterization gives an easy way to check that ^ k(N;v) is well
dened.9 Furthermore, ^ v^ k(N) also coincides with the concept that Zhao [22]
denotes as minimum no-blocking payo (MNBP). In that particular paper he
shows that the core has a nonempty relative interior if and only if ^ k(N;v) = 1.
Notice that ^ k(N;v) is dened using concepts that do not refer at all to the
associated zero-sum game. Nevertheless, it will be closely related to !(N;v).
Indeed the following proposition formalizes this fact.
Proposition 3.4: For any cooperative game (N;v), !(N;v) = 1
^ k(N;v).
The key to the proof of Proposition 3:4 is to relate the cooperative game to the
non-cooperative environment. This is achieved by characterizing !(N; ^ vk),
the expected utility of player A in the associated zero-sum game correspond-
ing to the k-expanded game.
9^ k(N;v) is bounded above by
P
SN v(S).
12Lemma 3.5: For any number k  1, the associated value of the k-expanded
game !(N; ^ vk) is equal to the minimum between one and the product of k
times the associated value of the original game !(N;v).
The intuition used in the proof of this lemma is as follows. Suppose that
(;) is a Nash equilibrium of G(N;v). The interesting case occurs when
uA(;) < 1. The only dierence between the zero-sum games G(N;v)
and G(N; ^ vk) is that when player B does not use the grand coalition the
payos are multiplied by k. If kuA(;) = k!(N;v) is still less than one,
then (;) is also a Nash equilibrium of G(N; ^ vk) and !(N; ^ vk) = k!(N;v).
Otherwise, player B chooses the grand coalition so that !(N; ^ vk) = 1.
4 The Extended Core
The previous section shows how, if the core is nonempty, imputations in the
core are generated from Nash equilibrium proles for player A. But, even
when the cooperative game has an empty core, it can still be associated with
a zero-sum game. The described non-cooperative framework now becomes
useful because it is also applicable to cooperative games that have an empty
core. The analogous to the core in this setting is the set of imputations gen-
erated by Nash equilibrium proles for player A. We call it the extended core.












) is a Nash eqm. of G(N;v)g
Of course, in the particular case in which the core is nonempty, Propositions
3.1 and 3.2 imply that the extended core and the core coincide. In this sense,
the extended core is a generalization of the core with a very important feature:
Proposition 4.2: The extended core is nonempty for any game (N;v).
Up to now the extended core is a mathematical concept with desirable prop-
erties but no economic intuition. The rst step towards interpreting the
13extended core in a cooperative setting is to characterize it without referring
to the associated zero-sum game. The following proposition shows how the
extended core of a cooperative game (N;v) can be found directly:
Proposition 4.3: To calculate directly the extended core of a cooperative
game (N;v), rst nd the smallest k-expanded game with a nonempty core
and then normalize the imputations in its core multiplying them by !(N;v).
More concisely, for any game (N;v), EC(N;v) = !(N;v)C(N; ^ v^ k(N;v)).
An objection could be raised about the fact that this concept is dened
by changing the original worths of coalitions somewhat arbitrarily. This
argument can be contested by the fact that both !(N;v) and ^ k(N;v) can be
expressed, using Proposition 2.4, in terms of the original worths of the game
(N;v) by the formula
1
!(N;v)





where the maximum ranges over all balanced families of coalitions B with
corresponding weights fSgS2B.
Notice that expanding the worth v(N) of the grand coalition by a factor of
^ k(N;v) is strategically equivalent to shrinking the worths of all proper coali-
tions S $ N by a factor of 1
^ k(N;v) = !(N;v).10 This observation leads to yet
another cooperative interpretation of the extended core.
Proposition 4.4: The game that results from multiplying the worth of all
proper coalitions by !(N;v) has a nonempty core and it coincides with the
extended core of the original game.
Suppose that an economic situation (e.g. the phone game) generates a game
in which for every imputation there exists a coalition with incentives to de-
viate, leading to an inecient outcome. If multiplying by !(N;v) is inter-
preted as imposing costs (or taxes) on proper coalition formation, the previ-
ous proposition describes a method for an exogenous regulatory institution
10If we look at the games as 2jNj-dimensional vectors, one is a scalar multiple of the
other
14to attain a stable and ecient situation. In other words, if proper coalition
formation is taxed a fraction 1 !(N;v) of its worth, it is impossible to block
imputations in the extended core. Furthermore 1   !(N;v) is the smallest
(least coercive) tax that is required to achieve this objective.
This kind of proportional taxation has been previously mentioned in the lit-
erature. Tijs and Driessen [18] propose to tax proportionally the surplus
v(S)  
P
i2S v(fig) generated by creating coalition S. The extended core
coincides with this concept when the worth of all singleton coalitions is zero
(e.g. if the original game is zero-one normalized.) Faigle and Kern [6] also
propose to take away a fraction of the worth of proper coalitions and apply
the concept to operation research topics such as traveling salesman games.
4.1 Applying the Extended Core to Empty Core Games
We proceed to calculate the extended core of the examples that have been













Hence, we conclude that EC(N;v) = f 2
n(1
2;:::; 1
2)g = f( 1
n;:::; 1
n)g. This
result seems to be plausible considering the symmetry of the game.
















15Contrary to what the previous examples might suggest, the extended core is
not always a singleton. Any game with a multiple-valued core is an example
of this. Moreover, even when the extended core is single valued, it will gen-
erally not coincide with the Shapley value. An example that illustrates these
points is the following:
v(1) = 5 v(2) = 2 v(3) = 2
v(12) = 5 v(13) = 5 v(23) = 5
v(123) = 10
Here the extended core is multiple valued (it actually coincides with the
core) and is given by C(N;v) = f(5;x;5   x) 2 R3 j x 2 [2;3]g. The Shap-
ley Value of this game is (41
3;25
6;25
6) so it is not included in the extended
core. Even if we increase v(2) = v(3) = 21
2 so that the extended core is single
valued, the Shapley Value will not coincide with the extended core.
4.2 How Far is a Game from Having a Nonempty Core?
The parameter !(N;v) is useful to determine if the game (N;v) is near or far
from having a nonempty core. Intuitively, a game with a higher !(N;v) than
another needs less costs to generate unblocked imputations, and so can be
considered closer to have a nonempty core. Moreover, the dierence between
the associated values can be used to tell if two games are near or far from
each other. In what follows we formalize these ideas, imposing a metric-like
structure over the space of games.
Notice that assigning numbers !(N;v) 2 (0;1] to any game (N;v) induces
an equivalence relation on  (N), the set of all cooperative games that have
N as their set of agents. The equivalence class corresponding to !(N;v) = 1
is precisely the set of games with nonempty cores.
Denition 4.5: Dene the equivalence relation R   (N) (N) as follows:
For any two games (N;v1);(N;v2) 2  (N) it is true that ((N;v1);(N;v2)) 2
16R if and only if !(N;v1) = !(N;v2). The equivalence classes in which  (N)
is partitioned are of the form
 (N) := f(N;v) 2  (N) j  = 1   !(N;v)g
The denition of  (N) uses  = 1 !(N;v) (as opposed to  = !(N;v)) so
that the parameter  can be used to decide how far is a game from having a
nonempty core.
Denition 4.6: Dene the function d :  (N)=R   (N)=R  ! [0;1] as fol-
lows: For any 1;2 2 [0;1], let d( 1(N); 2(N)) = j1   2j.
Proposition 4.7: The function d :  (N)=R (N)=R  ! [0;1] satises all
the properties of a distance function.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. We have thus proposed a
well dened concept of distance between equivalence classes of games.
4.3 How Far is an Imputation from Being in the Core?
Suppose that an exogenous regulator wants to impose a particular impu-
tation x on the agents of the cooperative game. A question of economic
interest is: What is the minimum level of taxes needed so that no coalition
has incentives to deviate from x? The non-cooperative framework can also
be used to answer this question. Using tools that are very similar to those
used in Subsection 4.2, now we impose a metric-like structure over the space
of imputations of a given game.
Denition 4.8: (Analogous to Denition 2:7) Let (N;v) be a game with








Denition 4.9: (Analogous to the last part of Denition 3:3) Let (N;v) be
a game. Given any imputation x, dene




Proposition 4.10: (Analogous to Proposition 3:4) For any imputation x,
!(x) = 1
^ k(x).
Denition 4.11: (Analogous to Denition 4:5) Let (N;v) denote the set
of imputations of the game (N;v). Dene the equivalence relation R0 
(N;v)  (N;v) as follows: For any two imputations x1;x2 2 (N;v), it
holds that (x1;x2) 2 R0 if and only if !(x1) = !(x2). The equivalence classes
in which (N;v) is partitioned are of the form
(N;v) := fx 2 (N;v) j  = 1   !(x)g
Denition 4.12: (Analogous to Denition 4:6) Dene the function d : (N;v)=R0
(N;v)=R0  ! [0;1] as follows: For any 1;2 2 [0;1], let d(1(N;v);2(N;v)) =
j1   2j.
Proposition 4.13: (Analogous to Proposition 4:7) The function d : (N;v)=R0
(N;v)=R0  ! [0;1] satises all the properties of a distance function.
5 The Proportional Nucleolus
The purpose of this section is to provide criteria for choosing a particular
imputation from all those that belong to the extended core. This line of
research has already been explored when the question is how to pick one
among all core imputations, giving rise to the nucleolus. We can solve the
extended core selection problem by using a modied version of this solution
concept.
The original nucleolus chooses the particular payo distribution that, in some
sense, minimizes protests of all coalitions. Given an imputation, dierent
coalitions will protest (or be satised) with their corresponding shares. One
18way to model the dierent level of this complaints is with the concept of
excess, i.e. how much more can a coalition generate by itself compared to
the share assigned to it.
Denition 5.1: Let S be a coalition and x an imputation in a given coopera-
tive game (N;v). Dene the excess of coalition S with respect to imputation
x by




Select (from a given set of payo vectors) all imputations that minimize the
magnitude of the protest of the unhappiest coalition. Among those, select all
imputations that minimize the magnitude of the protest of the second most
unhappy coalition. The set of imputations that is left after iterating this
process 2jNj  1 times is the nucleolus. Intuitively, minimizing the maximum
protest implies, in some sense, minimizing all of the protests. No coalition
can be too unsatised, so the payo vectors in the nucleolus are \fair" for all.
Denition 5.2: (Schmeidler [13]) Given a game (N;v) and a xed imputa-
tion x, let (x) be the 2jNj   1 dimensional vector that arranges all possible
excesses generated by x in decreasing order. If X is a nonempty set of im-
putations, dene the nucleolus of X N(X) as the set
N(X) = fx 2 X j (x) L (y) 8y 2 Xg
where L denotes the lexicographic order. Finally, dene the nucleolus of
the game (N;v) as the set N(N;v) equal to the nucleolus of the set of im-
putations of the game.11
Moreover, the nucleolus satises the following:
Proposition 5.3: (Schmeidler [13]) The nucleolus N(N;v) of a game satis-
es:
11Notice that according to this denition the nucleolus of a game can contain imputations
that are not individually rational. This concept is also known as prenucleolus.
19 N(N;v) is nonempty.
 N(N;v) is single-valued.
 If the core C(N;v) is nonempty, N(N;v) belongs to the core.
The previous properties justify that, if an imputation needs to be selected
from the core, the nucleolus is a good choice. Now, we go back to the question
of how to choose from the set of imputations of the extended core. We claim
that changing the denition of excess in a suitable manner solves the problem.
To give intuition about how the excess denition needs to be changed we will
go back to the non-cooperative framework previously discussed. The next
proposition gives an interpretation of the behavior of the column player in
the associated game G(N;v). Indeed, it is optimal for agent B to choose
coalitions that suer the biggest proportional loss given the payo vector
generated by strategy prole chosen by player A.
Proposition 5.4: Given a cooperative game (N;v), let (;) be a Nash
equilibrium of the associated game G(N;v). If (S) > 0 then the vector x
dened by xi = 










8T s.t. v(T) > 0:
In this context, it is more important what percentage of the original worth
is lost than the actual magnitude of the loss. Suppose, for the sake of ex-
ample, a game (N;v) such that two coalitions S and T satisfy v(S) = 4 and
v(T) = 100. If a payo vector takes away two units from both coalitions,
according to the conventional notion of excess they will complain equally.
In contrast, according to the proportional excess, S protest is far more im-
portant because S is loosing fty percent of its worth (compared with a two
percent loss of T.) To rigorously dene a notion of proportional excess, we
will assume that for every coalition S we have that v(S) > 0 to avoid division
by zero.
Denition 5.5: Let S be a coalition of positive worth and x an imputation
in a given cooperative game (N;v). Dene the proportional excess of








Denition 5.6: Given a game (N;v) and a xed imputation x, let ^ (x) be
the 2jNj 1 dimensional vector that arranges all possible proportional excesses
generated by x in decreasing order. If X is a nonempty set of imputations,
dene the proportional nucleolus of X ^ N(X) as the set
^ N(X) = fx 2 X j ^ (x) L ^ (y) 8y 2 Xg
where L denotes the lexicographic order. Finally, dene the proportional
nucleolus of the game (N;v) as the set ^ N(N;v) equal to the proportional
nucleolus of the set of imputations of the game.
The proportional nucleolus is originally attributed to Young, Okada and
Hashimoto [21], and has been used in solving cost allocation problems (see
[9].) If the game is not assumed to be strictly positive, single-valuedness is
impossible to obtain. For non-negative games, a similar but multiple-valued
concept called the nucleon is described in [7]. This paper deals with the com-
putational issues of the iterative process used to trim down the original set
of imputations. With the strictly positive assumption on coalitions' worths
we have:
Proposition 5.7: The proportional nucleolus ^ N(N;v) of a strictly positive
game satises:
 ^ N(N;v) is nonempty.
 ^ N(N;v) is single-valued.
 ^ N(N;v) always belongs to the extended core.
 If the core C(N;v) is nonempty, ^ N(N;v) belongs to the core.
21Thus, the proportional nucleolus is a sensible solution to the extended core
selection problem. This ability to select an imputation is another advantage
of the extended core as a solution concept.
6 Relation to the "-core
The "-core was rst suggested by Shapley and Shubik in [15] and numerous
variants have been dened in subsequent research. Most of the literature12
has focused on obtaining asymptotic results when the number of agents is
big. In this section we compare the proportional tax interpretation of the
extended core with the lump-sum taxation that occurs in the "-core. First,
we proceed to review the denitions of the two main variations of "-core
starting with the more restrictive. My reference for these denitions is [8].
Denition 6.1: Given a cooperative game (N;v), the strong "-core of





xi = v(N) and
X
i2S
xi  v(S)   " 8S  Ng:





xi = v(N) and
X
i2S
xi  v(S)   jSj" 8S  Ng:




-core  Strong "-core  Weak "-core
To show that (any of the variants of) the "-core is essentially dierent from
the extended core, we examine the following game and check that it is im-
possible to approximate the extended core by set containment between two
arbitrarily close (weak or strong) "-cores.
12e.g. see [20].
22Example: Consider the cooperative game dened as follows:
v(1) = 1 v(2) = 2 v(3) = 3
v(12) = 7 v(13) = 8 v(23) = 9
v(123) = 10
For this game, computing the value yields !(N;v) = 5
6. The extended core of
this game is then the singleton f(15
6 ; 20
6 ; 25
6 )g. On the other hand, consider the
strong "-core. Of course, if " is big enough, at some point the extended core
(and actually any imputation) will be included in the strong "-core. Never-
theless, we claim that no nonempty (weak or strong) "-core is contained in
the extended core of this game.
Indeed, the smallest " for which there is a nonempty strong "-core is equal
to 4
3. Similarly, the smallest " for which there is a nonempty weak "-core is
equal to 2








making it impossible that a nonempty "-core is contained in the extended
core. Furthermore, if " < 3
2 (respectively if " < 3
4) the strong "-core (respec-
tively weak "-core) is disjoint from the extended core.
In subsection 4.1 a taxing procedure to restore stability of ecient payo
vectors was proposed. An important reason to prefer the extended core over
the "-cores is that the latter may generate negative worths of coalitions after
taxation. In this example, to take away " = 4
3 from v(1) = 1 would imply
to give this singleton coalition a worth of  1
3. This problem will not occur
with the extended core because in that case the quantity taken away from a
coalition is always a fraction of its worth.
7 Open Questions
If the extended core is generalized to the case of games with nontransferable
utility, the concept may be applied to economic situations in which existence
of competitive equilibrium is not a given. Non-convexities, externalities, and
23public goods come to mind. It would be very interesting to compare the
method used by the extended core to restore eciency with the solutions
already proposed by the literature. In particular, is there any relationship
between Pigouvian taxation and the kind of taxes we have studied?
A vast literature13 has studied the branch of the Nash Program that refers
to the non-cooperative implementation of the core. As a natural extension of
the core, there is a good chance that such implementations can be modied
for the extended core.
Two important objections have been made against the concept of the core.
The rst one is that, although it has been axiomatized, usually the set of
axioms only refers to the subset of games that have a nonempty core (see
[12].) The second objection is that the core assumes that the grand coalition
always forms. We foresee the possibility of making one good thing out of two
bad ones. From my point of view, the problem lies in requiring a Pareto op-
timality axiom (this is equivalent to the second objection) in games with an
empty core. A concept that besides payo vectors explains coalition forma-
tion can deal with both objections simultaneously. The present work might
play a role in this project by relating optimal strategies for player B (in the
associated game) with those coalitions that are most likely to form.
13For a survey on the subject, see [17].
24Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 2.8: !(N;v)  1 for any (N;v).






Proposition 3.1: !(N;v) = 1 implies that C(N;v) 6= ;.
Proof: Let (;) be any Nash equilibrium of G(N;v). We show that the
imputation dened by x = v(N) belongs to C(v;N).14 Notice that for



















so that x 2 C(N;v). Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.2: C(N;v) 6= ; implies that !(N;v) = 1.
Proof: Let x 2 C(N;v) and (;) be a Nash equilibrium of G(N;v). We
prove that ( x
v(N);) is also a Nash equilibrium of G(N;v) and that the ex-
pected utility for player A for this Nash strategy prole is equal to one.
As x 2 C(N;v), then for any S  N,
14x is dened by distributing the worth of the grand coalition according to the weights
given by player A to the dierent strategies.






























Now, Proposition 2:8 implies !(N;v)  1, so that the previous inequalities
are binding. Finally, as uA( x
v(N);) = 1, ( x
v(N);) is a Nash equilibrium of
G(N;v). Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.5: (Used to prove Proposition 3:4) For any k  1, !(N; ^ vk) =
minf1;k!(N;v)g.
Proof: Denote the expected payo functions of the game G(N; ^ vk) by ^ uA
and ^ uB. Using the Min-Max Theorem, the following holds:

























= !(N; ^ vk)
26Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.4: For any game (N;v), !(N;v) = 1
^ k(N;v):
Proof: Using the previous propositions and the Lemma 3:5,
^ k(N;v) = minfk  1 j C(N; ^ vk) 6= ;g
= minfk  1 j !(N; ^ vk) = 1g
= minfk  1 j minf1;k!(N;v)g = 1g




which clearly implies the result. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.2: The extended core is nonempty for any game (N;v).
Proof: Non-emptiness follows directly from the Min-Max Theorem. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.3: For any game (N;v), EC(N;v) = !(N;v)C(N; ^ v^ k).
Proof: Let (;) be a Nash equilibrium of G(N;v). Assume that (N) =
0; otherwise C(N;v) 6= ; and the result follows. Denote the expected payo
function of player A in G(N; ^ v 1
w) and (N;v) by ^ uA and uA respectively. Let
x be an imputation of (N;v). Then


















() ^ v^ k(N) 
x
v(N)
2 C(N; ^ v^ k)
() ^ kv(N) 
x
v(N)
2 C(N; ^ v^ k)
() x 2 !(N;v)C(N; ^ v^ k):
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.4: The game that results from multiplying the worth of all
proper coalitions by !(N;v) has a nonempty core and it coincides with the
extended core of the original game.
Proof: Start with the ^ k-expanded game (which has a nonempty core) and
multiply the worth of every coalition by !(N;v). The new game, which co-
incides with the game that results after taxing proper coalitions, must still
have a nonempty core. Proposition 4.3 ensures that the core of the taxed
game is exactly the extended core. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.7: The function D :  (N)=R   (N)=R  ! [0;1] satises
all the properties of a distance.
Proof: The distance properties of D are directly inherited from the distance
properties of the Euclidean distance on [0;1]. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.10: (Analogous to Proposition 3:4) For any imputation x 2
(N;v), !(x) = 1
^ k(x).






























and the last inequality has to be binding, otherwise ^ k(x) would not be min-
imal. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.13: (Analogous to Proposition 4:7) The function d : (N)=R
(N)=R  ! [0;1] satises all the properties of a distance.
Proof: The distance properties of d are directly inherited from the distance
properties of the Euclidean distance on [0;1]. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.4: Given a cooperative game (N;v), let (;) be a Nash
equilibrium of the associated game G(N;v). If (S) > 0 then the vector x
dened by xi = 










8T s.t. v(T) > 0:



































29as we wanted. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.4: The nucleolus N(N;v) of a game satises:
 N(N;v) is nonempty.
 N(N;v) is single-valued.
 If the core C(N;v) is nonempty, N(N;v) belongs to the core.
Proof: See Schmeidler [13].
Proposition 5.7: The proportional nucleolus ^ N(N;v) of a game satises:
 ^ N(N;v) is nonempty.
 ^ N(N;v) is single-valued.
 ^ N(N;v) always belongs to the extended core.
Proof: The fact that the game is positive implies that the proportional excess
function ^ e(S;x) is continuous on both arguments. This allows the arguments
used by Schmeidler to be applicable in this setting.
For the last claim, notice that the proportional nucleolus ^ N(N;v) is a solution






























30so that player A is optimizing when his strategy prole is based on the propor-
tions in which the nucleolus distributes v(N). This is precisely the denition
of belonging to the extended core. Q.E.D.
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